Legal researchers have been concerned about the significance of using the tort liability process to offer economic incentives needed for efficient levels of taking precautions to limit accidental injuries. Medical malpractice is one of the most researched topics in a society based on empirical evidence. Numerous research studies on the proper functioning of the medical liability program and its impact on decision making in the health care sector had led to the findings of the shortcomings of the tort systems. It is also determined the degree of effects emerging from other structures of health care markets and delivery of health care services (Gimm 2010). For example, in the UK, the universal liability insurance without experience rating limits the deterrent observations from the various lawsuits and the integration of the individual medical personnel within the health care personnel and large systems of health care. Therefore, the paper seeks to examine whether the negligence liability for medical injuries is a better deterrence property compared to no-fault compensation programs.
Largely, the negligence liability for medical injuries could be said to be better deterrence programs than the no-fault compensation schemes. For example, the development of the clinical negligence programs is critical as it performs three crucial roles regarding compensating and deterring liability at a reasonable cost. The insignificant principle, there is a considerable comparison between no-fault options and negligence. Negligence can obtain better deterrence and compensate issues when care is poor (Ruhl & Littlefield 2015). However, no-fault compensation programs could be easy to administer compared to the negligence liability programs.
The problem with the no-fault compensation programs is that they might affect deterrence and need strict eligibility program to reduce the compensation costs. It was always difficult to determine the existence of the deterrence’s impact on clinical negligence which could be due to major data issues and limitations of the organization liability. In the UK, the compensation for medical injuries within the NHS hospitals is usually done based on the negligence of the medical practitioners (Karl, Born & Viscusi, 2016). However, recently, some no-fault reforms programs have been proposed. In the past years, the advocates for patient safety have convinced the hospital leadership that the expenses and costs of medical malpractice and adverse events comprise strong business aspects to promote safety improvements. It is recommended for the fulfillment of patient safety that helps solve public health concerns to reduce patient injuries that invest in improvements to lower adverse situations.
However many criticisms of clinical negligence programs as the volumes of claims will increase appeared recently. The increase in the volume of claims could be uncontrollable in the future. Another concern for NHS regarding applying clinical negligence is its cost. It is always difficult to deal with the costs associated with the increased volume of claims that include legal costs and damage payments. It is also problematic to prove that the negligence liability programs can deter the medical injuries. Some of the issues that make it challenging to understand whether negligence liability is better than no-fault compensation in deterring medical injuries include access to diluted incentives, agency problems, and defensive medicine (Mello et al. 2007). Other issues comprise the limitations involved in the measurement of care. Some of the models in the literature cover programs such as medical claims of clinician per unit and the risks of the clinical per hospital as well as the variations associated with the risks sharing arrangements. It relates to the altering hospital risks which could be paid on a tort claim.
Apart from encouraging the use of potential negligence liability, NHSLA also explored the potential of using incentive care to reduce medical injuries. NHSLA adjusts the premiums for experience rating by comparing the expected and actual claims level for each hospital by suggesting the implementation of combined care incentives. It will involve direct focusing behavior that hospital management could influence, and information about the hospital’s claims experience. NHSLA has also called for control of legal costs. According to Grembi (2014), the use of no-fault compensation for preventing medical injuries has not been effective because the accessibility to compensation for medical injuries in the health care systems in the UK depends on individual provider’s faults and blame. It is important for the UK hospitals to focus on public health gains to prevent medical errors (Hyman & Silver, 2012). However, the application of no-fault compensation faces legal concerns in handling the cases of harming patients in health care. The no-fault systems are concerned about the costs of the presumption to eliminate liability that dilutes incentives to obtain high-quality care services.
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In most cases, the no-fault programs eliminate the need for providing medical negligence. The no-fault compensation processes are practiced in medicine. The concepts of design of these health care systems could help inform the form of no-fault compensation process which could be implemented in the UK (Studdert & Brennan, 2001). With the prevailing error prevention concerns, the regulatory agencies noted that no-fault compensation was unable to deter medical errors as it leveraged on positive influences on health care provider’s behavior. However, the no-fault compensation approach can be well-structured to address medical error prevention in the UK. The major causes of medical injuries are less troublesome than negligence-based litigation claims.
The application of no-fault compensation programs has various shortcomings that make it unattractive compared to the negligence liability in eliminating medical injuries in the hospitals. In terms of compensation, no-fault is designed to omit large tort benefits that could be unfair to patients who suffer from medical malpractice in UK hospitals. It also does not state the individuate wage losses to some degree. No-fault compensation also provides low attorney’s fees rather than the customary fees in tort, and thus, it could lead to low quality and quantity of compensation cases (Waxman et al. 2014). The no-fault program could lead to an increase in fees that makes it unaffordable due to the high expenses compared to liability coverage. In terms of deterrence, the no-fault compensation could eliminate fault-finding efforts and the perception associated with it. The opposition of no-fault compensation implies that the loss of fault-based policies lowers incentives for certain tortfeasors to work with due care. It is also clear that the non-compensatory elements of torts that form the part of justice are also indicated by the fact-finding and investigation processes of tort.
Within the understanding of medical responsibility, no-fault compensation programs are critical in addressing issues of negligence. Nevertheless, major medical expertise is required to hold liability in such instances to push physicians to improve standards of care in UK hospitals. No-fault compensation programs face significant difficulties due to the relevant events. The proposals of medical causation are an important part in determining the events that can be compensated, thus reducing the demand for expert testimony and comprehensive decision-making programs during the times of claims (Fenn & Rickman, 2014). For now, the compensation of workers has been a critical program in offering new coverage for medical injuries. However, the compensation of workers for lack of faults does not focus on the patients as compared to the use of negligence liability programs. Therefore, the adoption of no-fault compensation practices will be ineffective in promoting the goals of reducing and eliminating medical injuries.
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Unlike the no-fault compensation programs, the use of a negligence liability approach focuses on the patients in the hospitals. It seeks to ensure that the physicians do not engage in medical malpractice threatening the life and health of the patients. The negligence liability program aligns the cases of medical malpractice to torts in the health care that makes it possible to prevent negligence care among the physicians. After suing a medical practitioner for negligence, it will help them to change practice patterns to protect the health of their patients in the long-term period. A malpractice claim has a significant impact on increasing the physician’s risk of contributing to future malpractice claims in society. Durand et al. (2015) noted that negligence liability was able to yield a high level of deterrence of medical injuries. In the health care sector, an optimal health care system must deal with the prevention of medical errors and compensate for the medical injuries properly. The health program will be critical in encouraging physicians and health care providers to understand the errors and causes of medical injuries.
With the significant aspect of no-fault to improve deterrence and compensation programs, the nature of no-fault compensation programs will have an impact on the detection of programs and issues of hospital safety advancements and growth. To improve incentives for preventing injuries, there is a significant mechanism to deal with the hospitals facing larger costs and expenditures. Such issues will bring attention to the purpose and the significance of medical liability programs. Some aspects of legal reforms and programs will increase the possibility of preventing injuries in society (Yang & Silverman, 2014). The development of the negligence liability will be effective in promoting compensation to the patients to improve incentives for safety.
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The high costs of current programs increase the issues of malpractice that physicians and hospitals face trying to meet the increased liability costs. The increase in claims is associated with measures to develop reasonable limitations on the damages given to the patients. In the health system, when medical injuries occur, the involved health care providers would be useful in disclosure and notification of the patient’s information for compensation as well as determining the offers for compensation. The negligence liability is important in developing appropriate administrative measures and structures to specialize in dealing with medical injury claims (Dickhoff, Cremers, Legemate & Koelemay, 2014). In terms of market reforms, the use of negligence liability is critical in understanding the need to use no-fault liability programs to obtain compensation for a wider class of injuries and potential for appeal. The physicians will also be satisfied with an approach of ensuring that liability of the medical malpractice is addressed. Thus, it is critical in addressing the error prevention programs to improve the reforms to ensure all medical errors are handled.
In summary, it is more appropriate to use the negligence liability for medical injuries for deterrence properties compared to the use of no-fault compensation programs. It is important for UK hospitals to focus on public health gains to prevent medical errors. However, the application of no-fault compensation faces legal concerns in handling the cases of harming patients in health care. No-fault compensation programs face significant difficulties due to the relevant events. The problem with the no-fault compensation programs is that they might affect deterrence and need the strict eligibility program to reduce the compensation costs. The use of no-fault compensation for preventing medical injuries has not been effective because the accessibility to compensation for medical injuries in the health care systems in the UK depends on individual provider’s faults.